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Buddhist Ethics in Japan and Tibet: 
A Comparative Study of the Adoption of 
Bodhisattva and Pratimoksa Precepts 
Karma Lekshe Tsomo 
The religious traditions of Japan and Tibet are complex and unique, yet many 
interesting parallels may be drawn concerning the introduction of Buddhism 
and its subsequent development in the two countries. Although two very 
different cultural environments greeted the arrival of the imported faith, we find 
striking similarities in their early Buddhist history. The period between the 
sixth and eighth centuries was one of intense interest in the Buddhist teachings 
in both countries, and in both, the Theravada, Mahay ana, and Vajrayana 
transmissions all eventually gained acceptance. In both cases, acceptance came 
first from the upper classes, who were attracted to the philosophical tenets and 
the ritual, and later from the masses, who responded more to the recitational 
and devotional aspects. In each case, liberal royal patronage contributed to the 
success of the new foreign religion and was responsible for the rapid 
construction of temples and monasteries. Moreover, in both countries efforts 
were made to establish an orthodox^ Bhiksu Sangha, without equivalent efforts 
being made to establish a Bhiksuni Sangha. Both countries received a wealth 
of cultural benefits, in such fields as art, language, and medicine, along with 
the religion they imported. Comparisons may even be made between Kobo 
Daishi (Kukai), the widely revered Tannic master of Japan, and Guru Rinpoche 
(Padmasambhava), the widely revered tannic master of Tibet, each of whom 
became legendary. 
With so many parallel developments in the two counnies, it is interesting 
to compare the nature, interrelationship, and subsequent impact of the lineages 
of moral discipline that were introduced, namely, the lineages of pratimoksa 
precepts and bodhisattva precepts.1 The critical question in both cases was 
whether or not the bodhisattva practitioner need follow the pratimoksa precepts. 
The opinion of Saicho (767-822), who argued in the negative, held sway in 
Japan; the opinion of Atisa (982-1054), who argued in the affirmative, 
predominated in Tibet. This chapter explores the two religious scenarios and 
the ramifications of these choices for subsequent Buddhist history. 
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First, going back to Indian precedents, we find that while many early 
Buddhist practitioners followed only the pratimoksa precepts, by the fourth 
century, large numbers also followed the bodhisattva precepts of the Greater 
Vehicle, or Mahayana, in addition to the pratimoksa precepts, whether the five 
precepts of a lay Buddhist or the numerous precepts of a renunciant. Originally, 
at least eighteen different schools of vinaya, or monastic discipline, developed, 
associated with the eighteen Vaibhasika schools that flourished in India.2 Three 
of these are still practiced today in various countries of the world. The 
Dharmaguptaka school was transmitted to Japan, via China, while the Mula-
sarvastivada school flourished in Tibet. The third school of vinaya extant today, 
the Theravada (or Sthaviravada), prevails in Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Sri 
Lanka, and Thailand. 
In early Indian Buddhism, monasticism was seen as the ideal condition for 
religious practice. Moral purity was extolled as the supreme, perfect foundation 
for spiritual growth, and the celibate life-style, free of family obligations, was 
considered most conducive to spiritual development. The monastic regulations, 
it was felt, not only assure harmony in the community of practitioners, but 
contribute directly to lessening mental defilements and taming the passions. In 
addition, with precepts as a basis, the karmic benefits of wholesome actions 
multiply exponentially; the more precepts one holds, the greater the benefits. 
Nowhere did the Buddha state that lay people were incapable of spiritual 
attainments, but he made it clear that, for very practical reasons, the homeless 
life was distinctly preferable as a working basis for spiritual growth. In both 
early Tibet and early Japan, monasticism was the ideal and it was this form 
that Buddhism took when it was first established. 
With the rise of Mahayana thought in India, monastics acquired an 
additional set of precepts, or moral guidelines, which translated the bodhisattva 
ideal to particular circumstances. There are several sources and various 
formulations of bodhisattva precepts in the Buddhist texts, Several of these are 
still practiced as living traditions today. The ten major and forty-eight minor 
precepts practiced by Chinese Buddhists derive directly from the Brahmajala 
Sutra, an apocryphal text written in China. The eighteen major and forty-six 
minor precepts that gained currency in Tibet derive from the Bodhisattva-
bhumi-sutra attributed to the Indian master Asanga (third to fourth centuries 
c.e.). A third tradition of bodhisattva precepts is that of Candragomin, a 
seventh century lay Indian teacher. Four major and forty-six minor precepts are 
contained in his Twenty Verses.3 A fourth tradition is Saicho's Perfect Ten 
Good Precepts, though it is uncertain whether he refers to (1) the ten major 
precepts of the Brahmajala Sutra, (2) the ten precepts of a novice, or (3) the 
ten virtuous actions (kusala-karma; three of body, four of speech, and three of 
mind).4 Still another tradition, which has become current in American Zen 
circles, is that of the Four Vows: to save all beings, eliminate all defilements, 
master all teachings, and realize enlightenment. These four vows can be traced 
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to the Chinese T'ien-t'ai master Chih-i (538-597) and are mentioned by Kukai 
in his Sango shila (Indications of the Goals of the Three Teachings).5 In his 
rescript of 813, Kukai emphasized observance of the ten virtuous actions, 
declaring that these were foundational for all higher precepts and inviolable fear 
all disciples of the Buddha. He taught that the Four Vows were Esoteric 
Buddhist precepts and constituted the essence of the Mahayana. They are 
entirely different in substance from the fourteen root and eight secondary 
pledges (samaya) described in the Tantric texts transmitted to Tibet.6 
SAICHO'S REVOLUTIONARY IDEA OF THE PRECEPTS 
Saicho's early monastic career followed the normal pattern of Japan at that 
time. At fourteen he became a novice and in 754, at the age of nineteen, he 
received the bhiksu ordination at Todaiji in Nara. After climbing Mr. Hiei, he 
made five vows that expressed the seriousness of his vocation. In 804, he was 
sent by Emperor Kanmu to China, where he received transmissions of Niu-t'ou 
Ch'an from Hsiu-jan, Esoteric initiation from Wei-hsiang, and teachings on 
T'ien-t'ai as well as bodhisattva precepts from Tao-sui. The bodhisattva 
precepts that he received were the precepts of the Brahmajala-sutra, taken by 
laypeople in China as well as by monks and nuns. For monks in China, the 
Brahmajala precepts were taken in addition to the 250 precepts contained in the 
Bhiksu-pratimoksa-sutra of the Dharmagupta lineage; for nuns, these were in 
addition to the 348 precepts contained in the Dharmagupta Bhiksuni-
pratimoksa-sutra. Among the 120 texts that Saicho collected and took back to 
Japan, five dealt with precepts, including one that was a subcommentary on the 
Dharmaguptaka Vinaya. This fact indicates that he was still concerned with the 
pratimoksa precepts at that time. 
Upon his return from China, however, Saicho became involved with 
establishing the Tendai school, which included distinguishing it from the other 
schools, effecting its independence from the domination of the Nara schools, 
asserting its superiority to these schools, and trying to assure its future 
prosperity. The policy he eventually formulated, of supplanting the pratimoksa 
ordination with a bodhisattva ordination for monks, was the result of a 
progressive evolution. This policy seems to have been a response to the 
challenges faced by the emerging Tendai tradition, particularly power politics 
in relation to the Nara schools, the restrictions on numbers of ordinands 
imposed by the Office of Monastic Affairs (Sogo), and tire fact that monks 
•raveling to the ordinations in Nara frequently failed to return to Mt. Hiei. First, 
he managed to get two Tendai candidates admitted to the government-
sponsored ordinations each year, which amounted to official recognition of the 
Tendai school. Then gradually, asserting the supremacy of tire Lotus Sutra with 
its teaching on One Vehicle, he argued for the establishment of a "purely 
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Mahayana" temple. Later, rejecting the pratimoksa precepts altogether, he 
declared that henceforth his students would follow only the Mahayana and 
"abandon inferior Hinayana practices forever."7 He proposed that Tendai 
ordinands be recognized as Mahayana monks, removing them from the 
monastic register and, thus, from government control. 
Saicho's primary rationale for rejecting the pratimoksa precepts was to 
remove the Tendai school from the jurisdiction of the Office of Monastic 
Affairs that was dominated by the Nara monks. This is not to suggest that his 
motivation was purely political, however, for Saicho was also firmly convinced 
of the superiority of the Mahayana precepts and explicitly denounced the 
pratimoksa precepts as self-centered and inferior. Nor, certainly, was it his 
intention to weaken standards of ethical behavior, for he endorsed strict 
adherence to monastic discipline and hoped to maintain it by requiring twelve 
years of intense training in seclusion on Mt Hiei. Nevertheless, his innovative 
proposal subsequently effected a major transformation within Japanese 
Buddhism by declaring that those receiving bodhisattva precepts were 
equivalent in status to bhiksus, even while none of the formal control 
mechanisms designed to regulate the order were in place. 
Even in the case of an orthodox Sangha community, with the support of the 
traditional system for imposing sanctions, the disciplining of offenders who 
refuse to recant presents a serious problem. What procedures does the Sangha 
administration have for dealing with recalcitrant monks and how are these 
procedures to be implemented? Except where the Sangha is subservient to 
governmental authority and thus subject to civil punishment or banishment (as 
in modern-day Thailand and Bhutan, for example), it is virtually impossible to 
enforce the defrocking of a monk. Moreover, in the Mahayana context, forcibly 
expelling penitent monks is problematic, since it counters the precept to accept 
offenders' apologies. Celibacy and the other stipulations of monastic life are 
voluntary commitments and, short of incarceration, difficult to impose. 
The situation becomes even more complex when we move beyond the 
confines of an orthodox monastic community. Without the commitments and 
guidelines set forth in the Bhiksu-pratimoksa to enforce monastic discipline, 
there is considerable ambiguity regarding conduct allowable for monks. By all 
reports the behavior of monks in Nara had already become quite lax, even with 
a system of tightly controlled bhiksu ordinations. One factor encouraging laxity 
was economic: as the ritual aspects of Buddhism came to be emphasized, lavish 
imperial patronage of monks had a degenerative effect on moral standards. 
Saicho was strongly in favor of strict monastic conduct and certainly did not 
intend to contribute to a decline in standards, yet without the traditional 
monastic regulations, it was unclear how discipline on ML Hiei could be 
maintained, especially after Saicho's passing. Saicho's innovation, a radical 
departure from orthodoxy, consequently had a profound impact upon Japanese 
religious institutions and thought. 
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PRATIMOKSA AS A BASIS FOR THE BODHISATTVA VOW 
It could be argued that the first five of the Brahmajala precepts (to refrain 
from killing, stealing, sexual activity, false speech, and intoxicants) are 
superfluous, in that they are a reiteration of the basic five precepts of a 
Buddhist layperson (upasaka/upasika). Four of the five (to refrain from killing, 
stealing, sexual activity, and false speech) correspond to the most essential 
restrictions for monks and nuns, transgressing any one of which constitutes a 
root downfall (parajika). One important difference, however, is that the 
pratimoksa specifically imposes strict celibacy on monks and nuns, and 
requires a bimonthly confession of faults to help reinforce this and other 
constraints. The Brahmajala Sutra, in contrast, constrains one merely to 
observe chaste conduct, a concept that is open to interpretation. At first, the 
distinction between pratimoksa and bodhisattva precepts was not clearly 
understood in Japan and even the requisite procedure for ordaining a monk was 
initially vague, such that monks were self-ordained. After this custom was 
reexamined, great pains were taken to invite high-ranking bhiksus from China 
and to implement a proper lineage of bhiksu ordination. In the setting of 
seventh-century Japanese, where instances of sexual activity among monks 
have been recorded, specific regulations and procedures for enforcement would 
presumably have worked to benefit the monastic establishment. Although we 
have no evidence that the other two required Sangha procedures, the bimonthly 
recitation of the pratimoksa and the annual rainy season retreat, were held 
regularly, the Nara schools did at least manage to supervise ordinations and 
maintain monastic standards to some extent. By dispensing with the pratimoksa 
as Saicho did, the days of monastic Buddhism, in the true sense of the term, 
were numbered. 
In Tibet, the question of whether pratimoksa precepts were prerequisite for 
receiving bodhisattva precepts became an important point of debate. No less a 
scholar than Tsong-kha-pa (1357-1419) argued in the negative, since such a 
prerequisite is not specifically set forth in the texts; if pratimoksa precepts were 
a precondition for receiving bodhisattva precepts, devas would be unable to 
take them, since the pratimoksa applies only to human beings. Proponents 
argued in the affirmative, following the logic that a person in a state of moral 
impoverishment would be unable to work constructively for the welfare of 
beings. Furthermore, since a bodhisattva naturally pursues all wholesome deeds, 
avoids all unwholesome deeds, and works relentlessly for the welfare of 
sentient beings, it is understood that he or she keeps at least the five basic 
moral maxims. 
While some Mahayanists argued that the bodhisattva precepts were superior 
and superseded the "lesser vehicle" precepts, others contended that a 
bodhisattva's moral conduct necessarily encompasses all wholesome actions and 
precludes all negative ones. The latter argued that sense pleasures (the major 
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challenge to a celibate) hold no more attraction for such a noble being than 
grass or feces, euphemized as "impurity." Not only are such things as hollow 
and meaningless as rubbish for those advancing swifdy by means of the 
"Greater Vehicle," they also function as impediments to the urgent task of 
liberating beings. For the bodhisattva, whose grandiose ambition is to save 
beings infinite in number, ethical purity should be instinctive, being both of 
intrinsic value and of practical benefit. The ultimate moral imperative embraces 
all three spheres of ethical conduct (1) to avoid unwholesome actions, (2) to 
engage in wholesome actions, and (3) to benefit sentient beings. 
Asanga was of this persuasion. He saw the observance of pratimoksa 
precepts as a natural corollary to the altruistic mind of enlightenment (bodhi-
citta). He explained the bodhisattva ethic as comprising three aspects: the ethic 
of the vow, the ethic of accumulating merit, and the ethic of benefitting beings. 
Some scholars understand "the ethic of the vow" to mean pratimoksa precepts 
and therefore consider pratimoksa precepts a precondition for the bodhisattva 
vow. In any case, It is clear that Asanga regarded pratimoksa ethics as 
axiomatic for a bodhisattva. 
For all Buddhists, morality is the first of "the three Buddhist trainings" and 
is foundational for the other two—concentration and wisdom. The Buddhist 
attitude is generally pragmatic rather than moralistic: unwholesome deeds 
become obstacles to concentration, concentration is preliminary to developing 
wisdom, and wisdom is essential for gaining liberation. Furthermore, for the 
Mahayana practitioner with the wisdom directly understanding emptiness (a 
distinguishing characteristic of the first bodhisattva stage), ethical conduct 
becomes spontaneous. At this stage, one automatically leaves off harming 
beings and violations of moral behavior become unthinkable. The question 
becomes how to judge when this stage has been reached. Some observers have 
surmised that the Japanese as a race, influenced by Shinto, regard themselves 
as naturally pure and beyond the need for ethical restrictions. The Shinto 
scholar Motoori Norinaga (1730-1801) regards "the natural mind," untouched 
by good and evil, as embodying the spirit of Japan.8 This concept, like the 
concept of original enlightenment, raises the eternal dilemma of whether 
affirming all that exists, non-judgm en tally accepting the natural state of one's 
mind just as we accept Nature's seasonal changes, means accommodating evil 
and the negative emotions. Among Buddhists, however, even among those 
Mahayanists who stress the doctrine of Buddha nature and the inherent purity 
of the mind, spontaneous moral purity comes only at a fairly high level of 
realization,'such as the Path of Insight and beyond. 
Objections to the pratimoksa precepts and justifications for abandoning 
them, however, continued to be advanced one after the other. One popular 
argument for dispensing with precepts was that in degenerate times no one can 
possibly keep them. Asanga disputed this line of reasoning. Although he denied 
that the pratimoksa precepts are specifically required for receiving the 
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bodhisattva precepts,9 he argues that especially in degenerate times it is 
important to receive both pratimoksa and bodhisattva precepts. Having 
generated the altruistic aspiration to enlightenment (bodhi-citta), one thereby 
becomes a child of the Buddha, and must therefore be scrupulous not to sully 
the reputation of the Buddha's kin. All of a person's behavior henceforth is 
adjudged by the high standards of a bodhisattva. Neglecting the bodhisattva 
resolve to work ceaselessly to remove the sufferings of beings, even for the 
time it takes to lie, kill, steal, have sex, or get drunk, fc* example, constitutes 
a transgression. 
THE SITUATION IN TIBET: ATI$A AND TSONG-KHA-PA 
The Bengali reformer Atisa, also known as Dipamkara Shrijnana, journeyed 
to Tibet in 1042. He set the trend for generations of Buddhist practitioners in 
Tibet, advising them that to observe bodhisattva and Tantric precepts in 
conjunction with pratimoksa precepts is essential. Receiving extensive teachings 
on bodiii-citta (Tibetan, gser-ling-pa) from Acarya Dharmakirti in Sumatra, he 
revived these quintessential Mahayana teachings in India and subsequently 
conveyed them to Tibet. To support his contention that Mahayana ethics are 
vast and inclusive, he quotes his teacher Bodhibhadra as saying, "The training 
of a bodhisattva is measureless and endless."10 Moreover, he argues, a 
bodhisattva necessarily considers the long-term benefits of an action, since 
sentient beings infinite in number are the beneficiaries. Comparatively 
speaking, the transgressions to be avoided are more extensive, the number of 
beings affected far larger, and the potential benefits far greater than in the case 
of pratimoksa precepts. 
The Tibetan master Tsong-kha-pa, famed as a yogi, writer, and Madhyamika 
scholar, was simultaneously a Tantric practitioner and a strict practitioner of the 
pratimoksa precepts. In his lifetime, he gave extensive teachings on Vinaya and 
presiding over many bhiksu ordinations. In illustrating the long-term practical 
worth of the celibate life, he was very graphic: 
For example, to block potential misbehavior may result in immediate 
unpleasantness. This is like strong, very distasteful medicine that appears 
harmful in the present but is resorted to ultimately because of its benefit 
for an illness. Sexual misconduct, on the other hand, appears pleasurable 
in the short term, yet from it spreads great suffering in the future: One 
must block it as though it were a tasty rice pudding laced with poison. 
In his "Three Principles of the Path,"" an encapsulation of the genre of 
teachings known in Tibet as Lam Rim ("Stages on the Path"), Tsong-kha-pa 
explains renunciation, bodhi-citta (the altruistic attitude of wishing to achieve 
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highest enlightenment for the sake of all sentient beings), and insight into 
emptiness (prajha) to be the essential elements of Mahayana practice, whether 
of the Sutra Vehicle or the Secret Mantra Vehicle. The first of these, 
renunciation, emphasizespratimoksa morality as the foundation upon which the 
other two, bodhi-citta and insight, develop. Thus, generally in Tibet and 
particularly in the Gelugpa school that Tsong-kha-pa founded, pratimoksa 
discipline is considered fundamental for the achievement of Buddhahood not 
only for monastics, but for lay followers as well. Still, while Tsong-kha-pa is 
well known as a reformer and reviver of pratimoksa discipline in Tibet, he 
concurred with Atisa in recommending an integral system of ethics that 
encompassed the pratimoksa, the bodhisattva, as well as the Secret Mantra 
precepts. 
Tsong-kha-pa explains in his Basic Path to Awakeningn, that addiction to 
cyclic existence is most effectively cured through the practice of moral 
discipline as embodied in the pratimoksa. Morality is likened to water that 
washes away all stains and to moonlight that cools all delusions. As Robert 
Thurman observes, "Perhaps Tzong Khapa's greatest contribution to Tibetan 
Buddhism was his emphasis on using the three higher trainings—the essence of 
the Hinayana—as bases and supplements to Tantric practice. Of course, these 
three were known in Tibet before Tzong Khapa's time, but only in words." 
Thurman quotes the great translator Taktzang Lotsawa: "Some, clinging to the 
Hinayana doctrines, abandoned the tantras. Others, loving the Tantric system, 
disparaged the Hinayana. But you, Tzong Khapa, are the sage who saw how 
to put every teaching given by Buddha perfecdy into practice."13 As understood 
by generations of Tibetan scholars, then, the pratimoksa precepts were not ends 
in themselves, but merely the best working basis upon which to achieve higher 
realizations. Although fastidious adherence to some minor rules, such as not 
eating after noon or handling money, has largely been abandoned over the 
ensuing centuries, a clear valuing of the pratimoksa precepts, particularly the 
ideal of celibacy, has remained part of the Tibetan tradition to the present. 
The relationship between the pratimoksa and bodhisattva precepts, each with 
its own intrinsic value, has remained quite clear, primarily modeled upon the 
thought of Atisa. Tsong-kha-pa, in particular, reinforced this line of thinking. 
Although he denies that pratimoksa ordination is a prerequisite for taking the 
bodhisattva ordination, he nevertheless recommends it: "In creating the 
bodhisattva vow you must relinquish the lesser-vehicle attitude, but you need 
not relinquish the pratimoksa vow."14 To receive either lay or monastic precepts 
beforehand, he says, is the natural order of tilings, like taking novice precepts 
before bhiksu precepts. He reasons that the pratimoksa is both Hinayana and 
Mahayana, since it serves as the foundation for both vehicles, the essence of 
both being to avoid reprehensible actions. Furthermore, to refrain from harming 
is implied by the vow to benefit Ethical conduct is enjoined not only upon 
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monastics, but also upon Tantric practitioners. Tsong-kha-pa quotes 
Jnanasimitra's Consistency of Ethics, Vows and Pledges: 
Having rejected the monastic vow, 
Neither the tantric vow nor that 
Of the perfections will be held.15 
While bodhisattva monastics are exalted, the laity is nowhere excluded. 
Mahayana texts cite numerous examples of highly realized lay practitioners and 
there are also examples of lay bodhisattvas who have gone on to become 
monks. It is not the monastic life-style in itself that is exalted, but moral purity 
that is praised for its soteriological value. 
COMMONALITY IN THE SYSTEMS OF PRECEPTS 
Although there is considerable overlap between the bodhisattva precepts of 
the Chinese (Brahmajala-sutra) tradition and the Tibetan (Bodhisattva-bhumi-
sutrai) tradition,16 one primary distinction between the two is that the 
Brahmajala tradition includes many offenses that are identical with or similar 
to pratimoksa offenses.17 Killing, stealing, unchastity, taking intoxicants, acting 
as a go-between, viewing armies, watching entertainments, baselessly accusing 
another of a major transgression, and giving deviant teachings belong to this 
category. There are no offences that are contradictory. 
The bodhisattva precepts followed in the Tibetan tradition do not evidence 
such an overlap with the pratimoksa. There are instances, in fact, where 
offenses are contradictory, that is, where the observance of a bodhisattva 
precept constitutes a direct violation of a pratimoksa precept. For example, 
accepting silver and gold is a transgression fca: a renunciant, yet not receiving 
such gifts is considered a fault for a bodhisattva, who is enjoined to accept 
"more than a million-million in gold and silver."18 The rationale behind 
accepting such gifts is that they afford the donor an opportunity to accumulate 
merit. Again, although monks and nuns are prohibited in the pratimoksa from 
keeping more than three robes and one bowl, bodhisattva practitioners should 
accept as much wealth as they are offered (unless, of course, one suspects that 
the gift is stolen property or that its giving will impoverish the giver), since 
such wealth can then be given in charity. It is incumbent upon bodhisattvas to 
provide material assistance to others; not to do so would violate the major 
precept on "Not giving material aid or the Dharma." 
Another case of contradictory precepts concerns killing. The classic worst 
case scenario in the texts is that of a bodhisattva (Buddha §akyamuni in a past 
1'fe) who killed a ship's captain who was plotting to murder five hundred 
merchants and steal their riches. The bodhisattva took upon himself the 
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negative consequences of killing to spare the ship captain from enacting a 
negative deed, as well as to save the merchants from suffering death. The 
bodhisattva was reborn immediately in hell (for just a moment) as a result of 
the action of killing, then took birth in a heavenly realm as a result of his 
action of great compassion. An historical example is the monk Palgyi Dorje 
who transgressed his bhiksu precepts, with bodhi-citta motivation, by 
assassinating the anti-Buddhist king Langdarma in 842 c.e. This instance 
illustrates the maxim that others' welfare supersedes one's own: the practitioner 
is willing to commit even a grave transgression of the pratimoksa precepts for 
the welfare of sentient beings. The forty-third Brahmajala precept specifically 
prohibits a deliberate violation of the prohibitions, but presumably this refers 
to a violation of the bodhi-citta precepts, not the pratimoksa. In the Tibetan 
system not to commit a violation of pratimoksa precepts when circumstances 
deem it necessary is a violation of the tenth and eleventh minor precepts. 
Asanga makes it clear that the bodhisattva's concern with providing 
requisites for others supersedes strict adherence to the monastic precepts. He 
does not, however, countenance those "supersedere" who use the principle to 
rationalize violations of the precepts and lax behavior. Bodhisattvas are 
enjoined to receive offerings for the benefit of others' practice of generosity, 
not for living in luxury. They may knowingly transgress the pratimoksa 
precepts, but they do so for the greater good, conscious of the karmic 
consequences. Although they may engage in actions that are reprehensible by 
nature, they do so with such skill-in-means that no fault ensues, but instead an 
effusion of great merit. 
DEALING WITH TRANSGRESSIONS 
The systems of pratimoksa and bodhisattva precepts not only are distinct 
in terms of content, they also prescribe different methods of handling 
transgressions. In his chapter on Ethics, Asanga states that a bodhisattva who 
commits a sin, does not relinquish the bodhisattva's moral precepts and can 
receive them again in that lifetime, whereas a bhiksu who acknowledges having 
committed a major transgression or defeat (parajika) cannot receive the bhiksu 
precepts again in that lifetime." The former transgression is remediable; the 
latter is likened to a broken glass that cannot be repaired. Tsong-kha-pa states 
that a pratimoksa defeat is regarded as final (few this lifetime), because it 
strikes at the heart of the intention of the vows, which is to exhaust the 
defilements. A major transgression of the bodhisattva precepts, by contrast, 
does not necessarily sever one's intention to liberate beings. 
Nevertheless, Tsong-kha-pa explains that a bodhisattva who has committed 
a defeat will be unable to generate the "purified intention," meaning that she 
or he will be unable to attain the actual bodhisattva stages and will be a 
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counterfeit, not a genuine bodhisattva." Though all is not lost, a person who 
commits a defeat thereby suffers a serious spiritual setback, forfeiting the 
opportunity for immense accumulation of merit and exponential progress on the 
path to enlightenment Santideva concurs in his Bodhicaryavatara: 
So between the power of the transgression, 
And the power of the awakening thought, 
He oscillates in samsara, long delayed 
From attainment of the [first bodhisattva] stage.20 
The Akasagarbha-sutra goes even further, stating that a defeat cuts one's roots 
of merit and propels one to a lower rebirth as well as a lengthy stay in 
Samsara. 
As is the case with the, pratimoksa precepts, there are certain conditions that 
qualify an action as a defeat in terms of bodhisattva ethics. To constitute a 
defeat, a transgression must be committed with complete involvement, except 
in the case of generating wrong views and abandoning bodhi-citta, which are 
defeats regardless of circumstances.21 "Complete involvement" is defined as 
committing the action without any sense of remorse, viewing it as something 
positive, rejoicing in it, and wishing to commit it again.22 
Tsong-kha-pa delineates two sets of bodhisattva transgressions. He 
designates four actions as "defeats" along the lines of the four defeats 
(parajikas, or major downfalls) of the Bhiksu-pratimoksa, while classifying 
other transgressions of the bodhisattva precepts as "misdeeds." The four types 
of defeats thus designated are (1) praising self and belittling others (out of 
desire for reputation and gain), (2) not sharing material wealth or the Dharma 
(out of miserliness), (3) not accepting an offender's apology (out of anger), and 
(4) repudiating the Mahayana teachings.23 In explaining the Akasagarbha-
sutra's list of five seminal transgressions for rulers and eight for beginners, 
Tsong-kha-pa maintains that the transgressions are fundamentally the same, just 
differently numbered.24 
Three of the precepts for beginners from the Akasagarbha (namely, 
rejecting the pratimoksa, claiming that desire and attachment are not eliminated 
by the sravaka vehicle, and falsely claiming to have attained realization) are 
included within the first defeat, that is, praising self and belittling others. The 
reasoning is that to praise the Mahayana, one's own vehicle, and deprecate the 
Lesser Vehicle" is tantamount to praising oneself and belittling others. The 
other precepts of the Bodhisattva-bhumi formulation can^similarly be correlated 
and subsumed within particular transgressions of the Akasagarbha-sutra. But 
wtat is interesting about this instance, particularly in light of subsequent events 
ln Japan, is that it explicitly prohibits deprecation of the Sravaka vehicle or 
repudiation of the pratimoksa precepts. The relevant precepts read as follows: 
) Rejecting the pratimoksa-, and (14) Disparaging Sravakas. 
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Tsong-kha-pa points out that it is a grave transgression to mislead a person, 
causing him or her to reject or turn away from the pratimoksa precepts by 
teaching that all defilements of body, speech, and mind will be purified simply 
through generating bodhi-citta and reciting teachings of the^Greater Vehicle.25 
Similarly, it is a grave transgression to repudiate the sravaka or pratyeka-
buddha vehicles and claim that no matter how hard one trains in them, 
defilements will not be eliminated—meaning that one will not become liberated 
from cyclic existence. 
In effect, this means that Tsong-kha-pa would consider Saicho guilty of a 
major bodhisattva transgression—namely, a defeat—because of his abandoning 
of the pratimoksa precepts. Moreover, each instance of exhorting others to 
abandon the pratimoksa and of suggesting that defilements are purified solely 
through practice of the Mahayana precepts would be an equally grave 
transgression. If he had repented his transgression and confessed it during his 
lifetime, it could have been purified and the vows restored, but there is no 
evidence that he did so. To regard the Mahayana precepts as superior is no 
fault, but denunciation of the pratimoksa constitutes a defeat in the Tibetan 
system. Harsh as it may seem, by the reasoning presented, adherents of the 
Tibetan system could conclude that Saicho and his followers did not achieve 
even the first stage of the bodhisattva path. 
CONCLUSION 
The question of ethical precepts in Japan and Tibet, of both the pratimoksa 
and bodhisattva categories, is no mere intellectual exercise. The question is 
thoroughly relevant in light of the current transmission of Buddhism to the 
West. The questions that were being asked then, in the early days of Buddhist 
transmission and adaptation in East Asia, are being asked again now: What is 
the benefit of celibacy? Why keep more precepts than necessary? Why should 
precepts be necessary for moral behavior? Do bodhisattva precepts not obviate 
pratimoksa precepts? Some new questions are being asked as well: Is a 
layperson less able to practice than a monk or nun? Why do nuns have to take 
more precepts than monks? Who needs monasticism anyway? Already we see 
evidence in Western countries of problems that developed in both Japan and 
Tibet, including abuses of power in religious centers, a need for direct lay 
participation, problems related to the role of women, and sexual abuse by 
religious leaders. The various solutions proposed in Japan and Tibet, as wel 
as their ultimate results, will be instructive for the Western Buddhist situation. 
One American Buddhist scholar has suggested that the virtually 
unattainable, transcendent goal of the Buddhism that went to Japan explains the 
Japanese lack of interest in ethics.26 He implies that the antinomian approac 
of the later Japanese Buddhist schools was antithetical to the practice of ethics. 
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However, the Buddhism that reached Tibet was similar, with its lofty goal of 
Buddhahood itself and its emphasis on faith, yet vinaya practice and the 
monastic ideal took root and survive to the present day. The divergent Buddhist 
developments regarding precepts in the two countries were strongly influenced 
by the attitudes and personal power of Saicho and Atisa, as well as by the 
organizational abilities of their followers. In the very different Western social 
milieu, the evolution of attitudes toward the precepts may similarly depend 
upon the viewpoints of particular personalities. 
Traditionally, precepts have been pivotal to Buddhist practice, yet many 
Westerners reject the very concept of restraint. When they take precepts at all, 
they are usually Tan trie precepts, most often without pratimoksa precepts as a 
basis. As occurred in Japan and Tibet, the bodhisattva and Tantric practices are 
taking precedence over the practice of the pratimoksa. One reason may be the 
ideals of individualism, unrestricted creative expression, and sense gratification, 
which are so prevalent in Western society. Another is a widespread rejection 
of authority among those embracing Buddhism. Furthermore, the theories of 
karma (cause and effect) and rebirth, which provide the underlying rationale 
for keeping precepts, are concepts still foreign to most Western minds. The 
concept of accruing merit through receiving and keeping precepts is equally 
foreign. The social and situational benefits of ethics are compatible with 
Western rationality, but in this respect Buddhist ethics do not differ 
significantly from Judeo-Christian ethics. The virtue of the Buddhist system for 
modern minds is its pragmatic approach and its emphasis on personal 
responsibility. 
The question conservative Buddhists ask is whether the goal of true 
enlightenment can be reached without the preliminary steps of the process. 
Many Tibetans prior to Atisa hoped to gain Tantric realizations without the 
foundational teachings on renunciation, compassion, and wisdom. Similarly, 
many Western people today hope for a simpler method of Buddhist practice, 
without precepts, schedules, studies, rules, or teachers. In the orthodox view, 
this is like expecting to gain fruit from a tree without cultivating the roots 
(renunciation, bodlu-citta, insight into emptiness) and branches (the six 
Perfections). Hoping to gain the fruits of spiritual practice without nurturing the 
simple virtues—the roots of the plant—may well result in disappointment We 
must wait to see which ethica_l model the Western Buddhist world will heed— 
whether that of Saicho, of Atisa, or perhaps an entirely different course. 
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NOTES 
1. Translated into Tibetan as so-so tar-pa, "individual liberation," and used 
in that sense in this chapter. 
2. For a comparison of various systematizations of the eighteen Vaibhasika 
schools, see Jeffrey Hopkins, Meditation on Emptiness (London: Wisdom 
Publications, 1983), pp. 413-19. 
3. The minor precepts include thirty-four injunctions to collect virtuous 
dharmas and twelve injunctions to promote the welfare of living beings, all 
phrased in the reverse. 
4. See Paul Groner, Saicho: The Establishment of the Tendai School 
(Berkeley: Berkeley Buddhist Studies Series, 1984), pp. 118-19. 
5. Translated in Kukai: Major Works by Yoshito S. Hakeda (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1972), pp. 137, 197. 
6. See Jeffrey Hopkins, The Kalachakra Tantra (London: Wisdom 
Publications, 1985), pp. 412-14. 
7. From the Eizan Daishen, quoted by Groner, p. 115. 
8. See Tamura Yoshiro, "Japanese Culture and the Tendai Concept of 
Original Enlightenment" in Japanese Journal of Religious Studies, Vol. XIV, 
2-3, 207. 
9. Mark Tatz, Asanga's Chapter on Ethics: With the Commentary ofTsong-
kha-pa (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1981), pp. 108-1_1. 
10. Quoted in Richard Sherburne's translation of Atisa's A Lamp for the 
Path and Commentary (Boston: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), p. 92. 
11. Translated in Robert Thurman's Life and Teachings of Tsong Khapa 
(Dharamsala: Library of Tibetan Works & Archives, 1982), pp. 57-58. 
12. A commentary to the chapter on Ethics from Asanga's Bodiusattva 
Stage, translated by Tatz, pp. 91-263. 
13. In The Life and Teachings of Tsong Khapa, Robert A. F. Thurman, ed. 
(Dharamsala: Library of Tibetan Works & Archives), pp. 257-58. 
14. Tatz, p. 109. 
15. Tatz, p. 111. 
16. The following is a comparison of the two systems (M - major precept, 
m - minor precept): 
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Bodhisattva Precept Brahmajala Tibetan 
Killing Ml <M8 
Stealing M2 <M5,M17 
False speech M4 <M16 
Praising self and deprecating others M7 Ml,m32 
Not giving material aid or Dharma M8 M2,m4,m7,m9, 
m38,m41,<ml8 
Refusing to accept offender's M9 M3,m8,ml9 
apology 
Slandering the Triple Gem M10 M4,M6 
Not accepting invitations mil m5 
Turning from Mahayana m8 (self) M12(others) 
m31 (self) 
Setting destructive fires ml4 M10 
Not respecting teachers and senior ml m3,m34 
monks 
Not making offerings to the Triple m6,m44 ml 
Gem 
Giving biased or deviant teachings ml5 M9 
Failing to care for the sick m9 m36 
Departing from altruistic resolve m34 ml4 
Failure to study the teachings m7,m22,m24 m27,m33 
Not answering questions m23 m4 
Distorting teachings for profit ml6 M14JM15 
Not making repentance m5 (others) ml6(self) 
Taking offerings intended for the mil M17 
Triple Gem 
17. Another distinction is that the prohibition against eating meat and 
pungent foods is conspicuously absent in the Tibetan rendition. The 
importance attached to dietary restrictions in the Chinese tradition may have 
Taoist origins. 
18. Tatz, pp. 209-10. 
19. Tatz, p. 65. 
20. Tatz, p. 183. 
21. "Wrong views" here means rejection of the Three Jewels, the law of 
cause and effect, and other essential Buddhist tenets. 
22. Or, according to the Sutra-samuccaya, committing it continuously for 
c duration of a watch, which is four hours. Tsong-kha-pa rejects this 
interpretation. 
23. See Tatz, pp. 157-62. 
24. Tatz, pp. 166-76. 
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25. Tatz, pp. 177-78. 
26. Gil Fronsdal, The Transition from Monastic to Priest in Japanese 
Buddhism, Unpub. paper, 1990, p. 12. 
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